In the last decade, formal logics have been used to model a wide range of ethical theories and principles with the goal of using these models within autonomous systems. Logics for modeling ethical theories, and their automated reasoners, have requirements that are different from modal logics used for other purposes, e.g. for temporal reasoning. Meeting these requirements necessitates investigation of new approaches for proof automation. Particularly, a quantified modal logic, the deontic cognitive event calculus (DC EC ), has been used to model various versions of the doctrine of double effect, akrasia, and virtue ethics. Using a fragment of DC EC , we outline these distinct characteristics and present a sketches of an algorithm that can help with some aspects proof automation for DC EC .
Introduction
Modal logics have been used for decades to model and study a diverse set of subjects -e.g. temporal reasoning, multi-agent systems, linguistic content and phenomena, and game theory [1, Part 4] . While deontic modal logics have been used to study ethical principles, it is only recently that such logics have been considered in a rigorous manner [3] with the goal of either using them in a computational system or using such a logic to analyze computational systems.
For example, a quantified modal logic, the deontic cognitive event calculus (DC EC ), has been used recently to model various versions of the Doctrine of Double Effect, akrasia, and virtue ethics [14, 12, 15, 13, 7] . These ethical principles and theories have a unique set of characteristics when compared with other domains, e.g. with temporal reasoning, in which modal logics have been used. 1 This implies that logics for modeling ethical theories have requirements that are different than those for modal logics used for other purposes. These requirements dictate investigation of new approaches for proof automation. We present a central set of these requirements in this paper. Using a fragment C 1 of DC EC , we also present an algorithm that can help enable proof automation which partially satisfies these requirements. 1 A note on the terms "ethical principles" and "ethical theories." An ethical theory is generally broader and more fundamental than an ethical principle. An ethical principle is ultimately a declarative statement usually cast under one or more ethical theories. E.g., the principle that one ought always to act with the intention to maximize utility for everyone would fall under the ethical theory known as utilitarianism. For a classic presentation of the main ethical theories and their key principles, see [10] .
Requirements for Modeling Ethical Theories
To illustrate the unique characteristics required for modeling ethical theories and principle, we use the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) augmented to handle self sacrifice. DDE is an ethical principle that can account for human judgment in moral dilemmas: situations in which all available actions have both significantly good and significantly bad consequences. According to DDE, an action α in such a situation is permissible iff "(1) it is morally neutral; (2) the net good consequences outweigh the bad consequences by a large amount; and (3) some of the good consequences are intended, while none of the bad consequences are. [11] "
A formalization of DDE is presented in [11] . While DDE has some empirical support [9] , it cannot account for instances of self-sacrifice. To handle self-sacrifice, an augmented version, DDE * , is presented and formalized in [13] . We now present an informal version of DDE * to illustrate the requirements.
We assume there is an ethical hierarchy of actions (e.g. forbidden, morally neutral, obligatory); see [2] . We also assume that we have a utility or goodness function for states of the world or effects. For an autonomous agent a, an action α in a situation σ at time t is said to be DDE * -compliant iff : C 1 At the time of the action, the agent a executing the action believes that the action is not forbidden (where, again, we assume an ethical hierarchy such as the one given by Bringsjord [2] , and require that the action be morally neutral or above morally neutral in such a hierarchy); C 2 At the time of the action, the agent a believes that the net utility or goodness of the action is greater than some positive amount γ;
C 3a At the time of the action, the agent a performing the action intends only the good effects;
C 3b At the time of the action, the agent a does not intend any of the bad effects;
C 4 the bad effects are not used by a as a means to obtain the good effects [unless a knows that the bad effects are confined to only a itself]; and C 5 if there are bad effects, the agent would rather the situation be different and the agent not have to perform the action; that is, the action is unavoidable.
With DDE * as the background, we outline the following requirements that are necessary in modeling not only DDE * but also other ethical theories and principles, such as virtue ethics and akrasia. We split the requirements into two parts: requirements for the logic, and additional requirements for the reasoner. [18] , but C 4 requires self beliefs known as de se beliefs. This requires modalities indexed by de se agents. This is needed to model statements such as "a believes that a herself believes that ...". For more details on de se beliefs, please see [13] and [5] .
Requirements for the
R 4 Quantifiers: Quantifiers are needed to handle comparisons between actions and for ordering actions by their consequences.
While the above core requriments are needed for DDE * , other features, such as the ability to represent uncertainty and counterfactuals, may be needed for some ethical theories. We omit these requirements from the core list above as there has not been as much discussion around these features. In addition to handling the above requirements, any reasoner for the logic should have the following capabilities: Additional Requirements for the Reasoner 1. Builtin Theories: Handling of simple arithmetic and causation. This is required for efficiently computing consequences, and causes of actions.
2. Justifications and Explanations: Any reasoning system in an ethically charged scenario should be able to explain and present its reasoning in a verifiable and understandable manner.
Answer Finding:
The reasoner should not only be used for proving that an action is ethical but should also be capable of finding the most ethical action in a given situation.
3 A Sparse Calculus C 1 C 1 is a straightforward modal extension of first-order logic that satisfies R 1 , R 2 , and R 4 . We have a modal operator B for belief, an operator O for obligation, and G to denote goals. The syntax and inference schemata of the system are shown below. Assume that we have a first-order alphabet augmented with a fixed finite set of symbols for agents Ag = {a 1 , . . . , a n } and a set of totally ordered symbols for time T = t 0 , . . . ,t n , . . . . Sometimes we use a for a i and t for t i . φ is a meta-variable for formulae, and A is any first-order atomic symbol. Given this, the grammar for wffs of C 1 follows. s i ::= standard first-order terms
B(a,t, φ) states that a believes at time t that φ holds. O(a,t, φ, ψ) states that a ought to ψ at time t that if φ holds. G(a,t, ψ) states that a has as a goal ψ at time t.
Inference System
We have three inference schemata: {I R , I B , I O }, shown in Table 1 . unify(a, b) denotes the most general first-order unifier of a and b. First-order reasoning is performed through I R , which is just first-order resolution. Reasoning with beliefs is done with I B . Beliefs propagate forward in time.
Reasoning with obligations is handled with I O : If an agent believes it has an obligation ψ when φ, and believes that φ, then it has a goal ψ.
Description
Inference Scheme O(a, φ, ψ) ) G(a, ψ)
Theorem Proving for Quantified Modal Logics
Proof from Γ to φ: A proof Π Γ φ from Γ to φ consists of a sequence of formulae φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ n such that (i) φ n ≡ φ; and (ii) for all 1 ≤ i < n, φ i is derived from {φ j | j < i} using I R , I B , or I O . Γ φ denotes that there is a proof Π Γ φ from Γ to φ.
An Algorithm Sketch
We now present an algorithm for handling the proof system for C 1 . Our goal is to leverage advances in first-order theorem proving to build the relevant reasoner. There are two straightforward but flawed ways this can be done. In the first approach, modal operators are simply represented by first-order predicates. This approach is the fastest but can quickly lead to well-known inconsistencies, as demonstrated in [4] .
In the second approach, the entire proof theory is implemented intricately in first-order logic, and the reasoning is carried out within first-order logic. Here, the first-order theorem prover simply functions as a declarative programming system. This approach, while accurate, can be inefficient. Our algorithm is based on a technique we term shadowing. At at high-level, we alternate between calling a first-order theorem prover and applying modal inference schemata. When we call the first-order prover, all modal atoms are converted into propositional atoms (i.e. the former are shadowed), to prevent substitution into modal contexts. This approach achieves speed without sacrificing consistency. The algorithm is briefly described below.
First we define the syntactic operation of atomizing a formula, denoted by A. Given any arbitrary formula φ, A [φ] is a unique atomic (propositional) symbol. Next, we define the level of a formula: level : Boolean → N.
φ is purely propositional formulae; e.g. Rainy 1; φ has first-order predicates or quantifiers e.g. Sleepy(jack) 2; φ has modal formulae e.g. K(a,t, Sleepy(jack)) Given the above definition, we can define the operation of shadowing a formula to a level. See Figures 1a  and 1b .
Shadowing
To shadow a formula χ to a level l, replace all sub-formulae χ in χ such that level(χ ) > l with A [χ ] simultaneously. We denote this by S[φ, l]. For a set Γ, the operation of shadowing all members in the set is simply denoted by S[Γ, l].
Assume we have access to a first-order prover P. For a set of pure first-order formulae Γ and a firstorder φ, P(Γ, φ) gives us a proof of Γ φ if such a first-order proof exists; otherwise fail is returned. See the algorithm sketch given below for a reasoner for C 1 :
A New Way: ShadowProver 
Implementation
The reasoner is available as an open-source Java library [16] . A lightweight Python interface is available for quick prototyping and experimentation; see Figure 2 . For the first-order prover, we use SNARK, due to its facilities for extension with procedural attachments and rewrite systems [17] . In addition, SNARK comes with theories for reasoning about simple arithmetic, lists, etc. For future work, we shall investigate and pursue integration with other theorem provers. Our prover is also integrated within the HyperSlate proof assistant, a modern extension of the Slate proof assistant [8] ; see Figure 3 for an example.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented requirements that modal logics for modeling ethical theories should satisfy. A reasoning algorithm that can satisfy some of the requirements was presented. Future work involves extending the reasoner to satisfy the other remaining requirements and proving that algorithm are sound and complete with respect to a core inference system. As there are no similar reasoning systems for DC EC , direct comparison with other modal logic reasoners is not possible, but we plan to isolate fragments of DC EC that can enable benchmarks and comparisons with reasoners for other similar logics..
